Mike Isaac’s Super Pumped (p. 232) reports that Uber used its app’s accelerometer and gyroscope to detect the sound of notifications that came from the Lyft app. If Uber knew that a driver also used Lyft, Uber could offer promotions designed to attract them to use Uber only.
Otto was a sham to transfer employees and know-how from Google
Mike Isaac’s Super Pumped (p. 228) indicates that the transition of Anthony Levandowski and other colleagues at Google’s self-driving program, from Google to Otto, was a sham designed to streamline their transition to Uber. He explains that Levandowski created Otto “as if he were interested in pursuing his own trucking startup” (emphasis added). Otto’s discussion with venture capitalists were, Isaac says, “mostly for appearance’s sake.” Uber’s acquisition of Otto was, Isaac says, effectively preordained.
Garrett Camp intentionally booked duplicative taxi rides
Frustrated with unreliable San Francisco taxis, Garrett Camp (later co-founder of Uber) used a “trick” of calling all major taxi services in San Francisco to ask for a pickup. He would use whichever taxi came first, meaning the rest would drive over and find no customer.
Source: Mike Isaac’s Super Pumped, p.69 (calling this “a dick move”)
Multiple competition regulators questioned Uber-Grab deal
Reviewing Uber’s proposed sale of its Southeast Asia business to Grab, the Competition Commisison of Singapore (CCS) announced that it is looking into the transaction.
Broadly, CCS said the proposed transaction would bring “substantial lessening of competition in relation to the chauffeured personal point-to-point transport passenger and booking services market in Singapore.” CCS therefore required Uber and Grab to maintain their pre-transaction pricing, policies, and products, and not to exchange any confidential information.
After CCS’s statement of concern, Malaysia’s Land Public Transport Commission also announced that it would examine the proposed transaction. The Philippines’ anti-trust agency, the Philippine Competition Commission, then stated similar concerns: “There are reasonable grounds that the said acquisition may likely substantially lessen, prevent, or restrict competition.”
Coverage from TechCrunch and prior critique from the author of this site.
Overlapping investor SoftBank sought to reduce competition
As Uber announced its sale of Southeast Asia assets to Grab, some flagged the overlapping investor that facilitated the transaction. In particular, SoftBank (a Japanese investment firm) held shares in both Grab and Uber. Owning part of both companies, SoftBank stood to profit no matter which one prevailed in the markets where both operated — but stood to lose if the firms engaged in continued competition with each other.
Furthermore, SoftBank specifically sought to broker peace between Grab and Uber: When investing in Uber in December 2017, SoftBank sought a discount exactly because it could influence Uber’s competitors across Asia.
Similar concerns arose from SoftBank holding shares in both Uber and Ola, a ride-hailing competitor in India. Discussing those overlapping holdings, SoftBank told the Economic Times of India: “we are hoping that we make peace between them at some point.” Such a “peace” could raise competition concerns in so far as it entailed competitors agreeing not to compete.
See Edelman’s critique of SoftBank’s role as well as economist Martin Schmalz’s tweet on the impact of cross-ownership.
Poised to sell Southeast Asia assets to Grab
Uber announced plans to sell its Southeast Asia assets to Grab, the dominant ride-hailing firm in that region. This transaction raised competition concerns because Grab and Uber jointly controlled the overwhelming majority of ride-hailing service in the region. The transaction thus created an effective monopoly for Grab — allowing the company to charge higher prices and fees, to the detriment of both drivers and passengers.
Sold Chinese assets to Didi
Rather than continuing to compete with Didi Chuxing, the dominant ride-hailing service in China, Uber sold its Chinese assets to that firm — essentially ending competition in ride-hailing in that country.
This transaction raised several concerns. One, Didi and Uber jointly controlled the overwhelming majority of ride-hailing service in China. The nearest competitor had just 3.3% market share as of the time of the transaction. The transaction thus created an effective monopoly for Didi — allowing Didi to charge higher prices and fees, to the detriment of both drivers and passengers.
Two, as part of the transaction, Uber received 17.5% ownership of Didi, and Didi in turn held an investment in Lyft. So the Didi-Uber deal made Uber a part owner of its biggest US competitor.
Intentionally blocked aggregators and comparison shopping
Uber banned aggregators from comparing Uber’s prices with competitors, raising antitrust/competition concerns. Analysis by Ben Edelman: How Uber Uses API Restrictions to Block Price Comparison and Impede Competition. July 2017 news coverage of Uber’s threats against comparison shopping tool Ride Fair.